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Abstract
I develop a dynamic model of bank runs that allows me to study
important phenomena such as the role of information externalities and
herd behavior of depositors as a source of bank runs. I show that
eliminating bank runs completely, even they can be generated by herd
behavior of depositors, has costs. Furthermore, a deposit contract
that allows for runs can achieve higher levels of depositor welfare than
a contract that completely eliminates them. Since early liquidation of
bank’s assets is costly, a central bank that acts as a lender of last resort
alleviates some of the costs associated with bank runs. Yet it cannot
prevent runs on healthy banks in the absence of perfect information
about the bank’s asset quality. In those cases, a deposit contract, even
with liquidity support from the central bank, cannot achieve the ﬁrst-
best e!cient outcome. As a policy measure, any eorts to give market
discipline a stronger role in achieving ﬁnancial stability should be ac-
companied by transparency and disclosure of information on banks’
soundness and management of the crisis.
1 Introduction
Throughout their history, banks have been subject to runs. It is a well-
known fact that banks have illiquid assets and liquid liabilities. This matu-
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rity mismatch makes banks vulnerable to runs if depositors become worried
about the bank’s asset quality and demand the return of their savings.
Although ﬁnancial crises including bank runs are no longer a matter
of concern in some parts of the world, the reality is that banking crises
are still a constant feature of economies for a majority of the countries.
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) show that during the period 1980-96, of the
181 IMF member countries, 133 experienced signiﬁcant banking problems.
Such problems aected developed, as well as developing and transitional
countries1 and had signiﬁcant costs as documented by many studies2.
Since the emergence of banks, supervision and regulation of the industry
evolved as government and private responses to banking panics. The studies
on the issue date back to Thornton (1802) that works on optimal central
bank policies for lending in times of distress. Over the two centuries since
Thornton (1802), many policies have been developed to prevent and manage
banking panics: suspension of convertibility, lender of last resort practices,
deposit insurance, risk-based capital requirements, to cite a few. In light
of the recent experiences, it is clear that the debate on these issues has not
come to an end yet.
In his classic, Lombard Street, Bagehot (1873) argues that during times
of panic, transparency on management of the crisis may reduce uncertainty
and may have a calming eect on ﬁnancial markets. In Bagehot’s own words:
“If people could be really convinced that they could have money if they
wait a day or two, and that utter ruin is not coming, most likely they would
cease to run in such a mad way for money. Either shut the Bank (of England)
at once and say it will not lend more than it commonly lends, or lend freely,
boldly, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on lending. To
lend a great deal, and yet not give the public conﬁdence that you will lend
su!ciently and eectually, is the worst of all policies.”
In this paper, I concentrate on the role of information externalities and
herd behavior of depositors as a source of bank runs and, consistent with
Bagehot’s advice, suggest that transparency and disclosure of information on
banks’ soundness and management of the crisis can alleviate and eliminate
1For example, over the past 25 years banking crises have hit such developed countries
as Finland (1991-93), Norway (1988-92), Japan (1992-present), Spain (1977-85), and Swe-
den (1991) and have recently troubled such developing countries as Russia (1998), Brazil
(1999), Turkey (2000) and (2001) and Argentina (2001), and various counties in Asia
(1997-98).
2See Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Lindgren et.al.
(1999), Alexander et.al. (1997), Sundararajan and Baliño (1991), Hoggarth, Reis and
Saporta (2001).
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some of the problems related to bank runs.
In doing so, I search for answers to some important questions, that are
closely related with the stability of the banking system, such as:
• Can information externalities and herd behavior of depositors trigger
bank runs?
• What are the costs of preventing these types of bank runs?
• Does optimal deposit contract allow for bank runs even when they can
be generated by herd behavior of depositors and can be on healthy
banks?
• In the presence of noisy private information, can a deposit contract,
even with liquidity support3 from the central bank, achieve the ﬁrst-
best e!cient outcome with public information?
When we look at the literature, we see that the bank run models have
some common features. Most of them are static two-period equilibrium
based models with a continuum of agents played in the simultaneous form.
But Brunnermeier (2001) makes an important observation on the bank runs
literature: “Although withdrawals by deposit holders occur sequentially in
reality, the literature typically models bank runs as a simultaneous move
game4”. With static models, we cannot analyze the dynamics of bank runs
and we cannot answer some of the questions I address. For these reasons, I
diverge from these common features of bank run models.
In this paper, I build a model similar to the models of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (1998) (DD and AG, respectively, from
now on) but this is a dynamic model of bank runs where depositors move
sequentially rather than simultaneously. This allows me to investigate the
role of information externalities and herd behavior of depositors as a source
of banking panics. The important feature of the model is that in an interim
3In this paper, liquidity support will be only against good collateral. Therefore, it is
not a bailout of the bank. See Section 6 for a detailed discussion.
4A few exceptions where depositors move sequentially would be Chen (1999), Green and
Lin (2003) and Schotter and Yorulmazer (2003). Chen (1999) extends the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) model to multiple banks and allows for interim revelation of information
about some banks’ performance. A su!cient number of bank failures results in pessimistic
expectations about the general state of the economy and leads to runs on the remaining
banks. This is a model with multiple banks that explains possible channels for contagion.
In my model, there is only one bank. Therefore, my set up is not suitable to study
contagion.
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stage, depositors receive noisy private signals about the bank’s asset quality
and observe the actions of other depositors who move before them5. Since
these signals are noisy, information revealed by the actions of depositors
have value for other depositors. Depositors update their beliefs on the basis
of these actions and their own private signals. A few number of withdrawals
can lead depositors to withdraw even when they have a favorable signal
about the prospects of the bank’s investments. Hence, herd behavior of
depositors can trigger a run on a healthy bank.
Early liquidation of bank’s assets is costly, so the bank may choose a
deposit contract that completely eliminates runs. To be able to do so, the
bank has to promise a small return for those who want to withdraw early
so that even a depositor who has observed a bad signal about the bank’s
prospects chooses not to withdraw. This will undermine the insurance pro-
vided by the deposit contract against a liquidity shock and is an important
trade-o the bank needs to consider in choosing the deposit contract. I show
that for a signiﬁcant set of parameter values, it is optimal to allow for runs
even if they can be generated by herd behavior of depositors and can be on
healthy banks.
In the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome with public information, when the bank
cannot pay everybody the promised amount, the optimal arrangement is to
distribute all the available funds equally among all depositors. But when
bank runs are eliminated, early depositors will get their promised amount
and if the return from the bank’s investments is low, late depositors will
get very little. This is another cost of eliminating runs completely the bank
takes into account in choosing the optimal deposit contract (see AG for a
detailed analysis).
In the bank runs literature, there are two main views about what triggers
bank runs. One view states that bank runs are self-fulling phenomenon
generated by “sunspots” as in the pioneering work of DD. They show that
a deposit contract can give the optimal allocation by providing depositors
insurance against uncertainty about their liquidity needs. If nobody thinks
that there will be a run on the bank, only depositors with urgent liquidity
needs withdraw early and there is no bank run. But, if depositors think that
other depositors will withdraw their money, it is optimal for them to do so
since there will not be anything left for them if they do not withdraw. This
is the Pareto inferior bank run outcome. Sunspots determine which of these
self-fulﬁlling outcomes will occur.
5To capture this, I use a very similar structure to the discrete signals model of Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).
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Another view is that bank runs are natural consequences of the business
cycle and they are information based. Gorton (1988) and Calomiris and
Gorton (1991) empirically show that the banking crises in US in the late
19th and early 20th century are actual consequences of the business cycle
and they are information driven.
In this paper there are both payo and information externalities6 allow-
ing me to combine some features of these two main views of bank runs in
one model7. In my model, bank runs are triggered by the withdrawal deci-
sions of a few number of depositors, revealing that they have adverse news
about the bank’s performance. This makes bank runs information driven.
Yet, because of payo and information externalities, once a run is triggered,
it is optimal for everyone else to join the run even if they had good news
about the bank’s asset quality initially. Since depositors have noisy private
signals, runs can be on healthy banks. Saunders and Wilson (1996) provides
historical evidence of runs on healthy banks, as I will later discuss in detail.
Here, I concentrate on some particular equilibria of the model which
I ﬁnd to be the most interesting8. There may be other equilibria, where
“everybody runs” being a likely candidate. Since this is a dynamic game
with information externalities, the public belief about the prospects of the
bank evolves during the play of the game. When the public belief falls below
a threshold, it is a dominant strategy to withdraw which makes a bank run
the unique outcome from then on. When the public belief is above that
threshold, “everybody runs” equilibrium can be eliminated by a constraint
added to the deposit contract as long as the utility from receiving nothing
from the bank is not extremely low9.
There are models with unique equilibrium to the bank run game in the
literature but their features dier from my model. Some of these share
the limitations of the models mentioned before. Therefore they are not
appropriate models for the purposes of this paper. Following is a discussion
6 In many situations we observe both of these externalities in action but we have very
few models studying this. Some would be Neeman and Orosel (1999), Dasgupta (2000)
and Yorulmazer (2003).
7Though I have payo externalities, the real reason that triggers a run is the information
externalities. When the public belief about bank’s prospects fall below a threshold, a run
is triggered. This is a situation similar to the one sketched in Allen and Morris (2001).
But with the help of payo externalities, I show that once a run is triggered, everybody
will join (see footnote 29).
8Postlewaite and Vives (1987) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988) build models of
incomplete information with a unique Bayesian equilibrium that has a positive probability
of bank runs.
9See footnote 29 for a similar discussion.
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of these studies and my model’s dierences from them.
Green and Lin (2001), using a ﬁnite-player version of DD, develop a di-
rect mechanism that implements the ex-ante e!cient allocation as a unique
outcome even when the bank uses the sequential-service constraint. In their
model, aggregate uncertainty stems from the proportion of depositors that
are subject to the liquidity shock. The return from the risky asset is con-
stant. In my model, the return from the risky asset is random and this is
the source of aggregate uncertainty. Their mechanism, under the sequen-
tial service constraint, pays dierent amounts to depositors who want to
withdraw early, depending on the position they arrive the bank. This type
of arrangement is not feasible in my contract space: depositors are treated
equally in my model.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) use the equilibrium selection method10
introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and ﬁnd a unique equilibrium
in which fundamentals determine whether a bank run will occur or not. But
they have a continuum of agents and the bank run game is played in the
simultaneous form. With their set up, it may not be possible to answer some
of the questions my paper is interested in such as the role of information
externalities and herd behavior of depositors as a source of bank runs. Also,
Saunders and Wilson (1996) and Park (1991) empirically document runs on
healthy banks which is in contrast with the predictions of their model.
Some studies show that deposit contracts that are subject to bank runs
are optimal arrangements and provide e!cient outcomes. But in those mod-
els, information about banks’ asset quality is perfect, and is public observed
(AG) or revealed through the actions of insiders, who are perfectly informed
about the performance of their bank (Calomiris and Kahn (1991)).
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that the deposit contract is the optimal
arrangement even though it might create opportunity for bank runs and
costly liquidation. The rationale behind this argument is that depositors
can monitor their banks, which can act against their interest, by liquidating
their funds. The event that triggers a run is the withdrawal decisions of the
insiders.
Allen and Gale (1998) builds a model consistent with the empirical ev-
idence of Gorton (1988) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991) that banking
panics are related with the business cycle and are not the result of sunspots.
They show that bank runs allow e!cient risk sharing between early and late
10Morris and Shin (2001) is an excellent article on the theory and the applications of
global games including applications on bank runs. Morris and Shin (1998) uses the same
technique to ﬁnd unique equilibrium in a model of currency attacks.
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withdrawing depositors and allow banks to hold e!cient portfolios. When
runs carry costs due to early liquidation of assets, the ﬁrst-best e!cient
outcome can be achieved by liquidity support from the central bank. In
their model, the asset quality of the bank is realized and publicly observed
in an interim period. This is crucial for the deposit contract, with liquidity
support of the central bank, to achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
In contrast with the models discussed above, some studies provide empir-
ical evidence for runs on healthy banks. For example, Saunders and Wilson
(1996) examine deposit ﬂows in 163 failed and 229 surviving banks over the
Depression era of 1929-1933 in US. In the years 1929 and 1933, they ﬁnd
evidence of “ﬂight to quality” where withdrawals from failed banks were
associated with deposit increases in surviving banks. However, they observe
a decrease in deposits in both failed and surviving banks for the period of
1930-32. During this time, healthy banks experienced runs, too.
In another study, Park (1991)11 looks at banking panics in US history
and empirically shows that the government or banks stopped panics mainly
by providing information on banks’ solvency rather than liquidity12. He
compares dierent arrangements used to manage and prevent banking pan-
ics according to their information provision and concludes that the arrange-
ments that provided information on banks’ solvency were successful while
those that provided only liquidity failed. He examines three dierent ar-
rangements: equalization of reserves, clearing house loan arrangements and
suspension of payments.
Clearing House loan certiﬁcates were acquired by banks by depositing
qualifying assets with the Clearing House Association and they were used in
interbank settlements. They prevent costly liquidation of assets and improve
bank’s liquidity position. Since they were provided only when the Clearing
House Association decided that the bank has enough assets to back them
up, they also served the purpose of providing information that the bank was
healthy.
Equalization of reserves was basically pooling all legal reserves of Clear-
ing House Association member banks in an emergency and granting member
banks equal access to the pooled resources. While equalization of reserves
enhanced liquidity in the bank under attack, it did not provide any informa-
tion on bank’s asset quality. Because of this lack of information, equalization
11Gorton (1985), Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) and Gorton and Huang (2002) docu-
ment similar experiences. Sprague (1910) is an excellent source for banking crises in US
under the national banking system.
12For an excellent survey on the role of ”lender of last resort” in crisis management, see
Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa (1999).
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of reserves was ineective in preventing runs when used in the 1873 crisis.
Instead, stability of the banking system was established by using Clearing
House loan certiﬁcates.
Suspension of payments was another arrangement used to manage bank-
ing panics. Their major role was to provide information rather than liq-
uidity. Suspensions were always followed by thorough examination of the
banks’ assets. While banks with solvency problems were liquidated, solvent
banks were reopened. This selective reopening procedure assured the public
that the reopened banks were healthy. As a result of this, runs on reopened
banks did not recur in most cases.
The results of this paper are in parallel with the empirical evidence dis-
cussed. In this model, while liquidity support alleviates the costs of early liq-
uidation, it cannot prevent runs on healthy banks. The policy measure that
will prevent these type of runs is the disclosure of information on the bank’s
soundness and management of the crisis. A deposit contract can achieve the
ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome only in the presence of perfect information about
the banks’ performance. In that sense, my results are complementary to the
ﬁndings of the studies that suggest that a deposit contract, with liquidity
support from the central bank, can achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
In this paper, I argue that, while liquidity support is necessary, it is not
su!cient in achieving the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome. It has to be accom-
panied by transparency and disclosure of information on banks’ soundness
and management of crises.
This paper makes important suggestions on the policy side. In my model,
deposit insurance can prevent runs and since early liquidation is costly, this
can be welfare improving. But it is a well-known fact that in the presence of
full insurance, depositors do not have any incentive to dierentiate between
sound and unsound banks. In such an environment, weak banks do not have
any di!culty in attracting deposits. This creates an opportunity for moral
hazard on banks’ side that can cause adverse eects on the stability of the
banking system.
Financial regulators and policy makers have been looking for alterna-
tives for full deposit insurance (see Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998)
for a comprehensive survey). Giving a stronger role on market discipline
may lessen the moral hazard problem. But for market discipline to work ef-
fectively, depositors should have accurate information about the soundness
of banks. This paper shows that in the absence of accurate information, in-
formation externalities and herd behavior of depositors can lead to runs on
healthy banks. This undermines the role of market discipline in keeping an
eye on bank activities. Therefore disclosure of information on banks’ struc-
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ture, performance and risk positions should be enforced13. This is “pillar
three” of Basel II regime and this should be fully pursued to increase the
eectiveness of market discipline, which can be an alternative for deposit
insurance in achieving ﬁnancial stability.
We can summarize the two main results of this paper as:
• In the presence of noisy private signals, for a signiﬁcant set of param-
eter values, the optimal deposit contract allows for bank runs even if
they can be generated by herd behavior of depositors and they can be
on healthy banks.
• In the absence of perfect information on bank’s performance, a deposit
contract, with liquidity support from the central bank, cannot achieve
the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in
Section 2. In Section 3, I present the special case where the bank’s return
is publicly observed that serves as a benchmark model. Section 4 describes
the information structure of the model with private noisy signals. I inves-
tigate dierent deposit contracts the bank can choose in Section 5. Section
6 analyzes the eect of liquidity support from the central bank and inves-
tigates whether it can prevent runs on healthy banks. Section 7 elaborates
on policy implications of the model, in particular on transparency and dis-
closure of information on bank’s performance and management of the crisis.
Concluding remarks are in Section 8.
2 Model
The model is similar to the models of DD and AG. The main dierence is
that we have an inﬁnite number of depositors rather than a continuum. This
way, I can develop a model of bank runs, where depositors move sequentially,
and therefore, incorporate information externalities into the model. As men-
tioned in Brunnermeier (2001), this is a more realistic representation of bank
13Rochet and Vives (2002) ﬁnds dierent results on the optimal disclosure policy of the
Central Bank. They use the “global games” analysis of Carlsson and van Damme (1983)
and ﬁnd a unique equilibrium. In this unique equilibrium, there is an intermediate range
of fundamentals where there is a potential for a coordination failure. Central Bank, by
providing information that becomes common knowledge, can move the interbank market
into a regime of multiple equilibria when the fundamentals are in that intermediate range.
By adding noise to its announcements, Central Bank prevents switching to the regime
of multiple equilibria. But they have a simultaneous move game while my model is a
sequential move model of bank runs.
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runs in the real world and will help me investigate the role of herding and
information externalities as a source of bank runs.
There are three periods, w = 0> 1> 2 and a single consumption good avail-
able at each date.
There is a bank that oers depositors a deposit contract and makes
investments on their behalf. I assume that the banking sector is competitive
so that the bank chooses the deposit contract that maximizes the welfare of
depositors.
There are two assets : a safe and a risky asset. The safe asset is a storage
technology that pays one unit at date w+ 1 for each unit invested at date w.
Both the depositors and the bank have access to the safe asset.
The risky asset that pays a random return of eU at w = 2 for each unit
invested at w = 0, where
eU = ( U with probability 1@2
u with probability 1@2
=
We have u ? 1 ? U so that the risky asset does not dominate the safe asset.
Only banks have access to the risky asset. Risky asset can be liquidated at
w = 1 but only with some discount. When liquidated early, only a fraction
 of the return can be collected. Therefore the return at w = 1 is  eU where
 5 (0> 1)=
There is an inﬁnite number of depositors. A depositor can be an early
or a late consumer. Early consumers value consumption at w = 1 only, while
late consumers value consumption at w = 2. I assume that the types are
public information when realized but the bank cannot write type speciﬁc
contracts14. Ex-ante, depositors do not know their type but they know the
probability distribution over types. Probability of being an early consumer is
 and since there is an inﬁnite number of depositors,  is also the proportion
of early consumers. As a result, there is no aggregate uncertainty resulting
from the proportion of depositors that are subject to the liquidity shock.
Therefore consumers have the following preferences :
X(f1> f2) =
(
x(f1) with probability 
x(f2) with probability 1 
where fw denotes consumption at date w = 1> 2. x is strictly increasing (x0 A
0) and strictly concave (x00 ? 0). Further, it satisﬁes the Inada conditions:
14See Section 3.2 for a discussion.
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x0(0) = 4 and x0(4) = 0. Depositors have an initial endowment of 1 unit
of the consumption good at w = 0 and nothing at w = 1 and w = 2=
3 Publicly Observed Return
In this section, I assume that the realization of eU is publicly observed at
w = 1. Since eU can take only two values, the following is just a simpliﬁed
version of AG. For this special case, I will ﬁnd the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome
and show that a deposit contract with liquidity support from the central
bank can achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
3.1 First-Best E!cient Outcome
For the moment, I assume that the bank can write contracts conditional oneU= Therefore, the resulting allocation will be the ﬁrst-best allocation (for a
detailed discussion see AG).
I assume that the risky asset cannot be liquidated at w = 1> for now.
The bank will choose a portfolio of the safe (O) and the risky asset
([) out of the initial endowment 1 at w = 0 and will also determine the
consumption levels fw( eU) conditional on the realization of eU that maximize
the ex-ante expected utility of the representative depositor. So the bank’s
problem can be written as:
(S1)
;
AAAAA?
AAAAA=
pd{ H[x(f1( eU) + (1 )x(f2( eU))]
v=w= (l) O+[ 6 1
(ll) f1( eU) 6 O
(lll) f1( eU) + (1 )f2( eU) 6 O+ eU[
(ly) f1( eU) 6 f2( eU)
The ﬁrst constraint is the feasibility constraint for the portfolio chosen
at w = 0. Since the risky asset cannot be liquidated, the second constraint
insures that the bank has enough safe asset to pay early consumers. The
third constraint insures that the consumption levels provided by the deposit
contract can be achieved. The last constraint is an incentive compatibility
constraint to separate early and late consumers.
Since x(=) is strictly concave, the FOC uniquely characterizes the opti-
mum. Depositors are risk averse so the best arrangement when everyone
11
state\outcome f1 f2
U O
[U
13
u O+ u[ O+ u[
Table 1: Payos for early and late depositors in dierent states.
cannot be paid O is to distribute all funds equally among all depositors.
This gives us the payos explained in Table 1 where the optimal level of O
and [ are given by the ﬁrst-order conditions15.
3.2 Optimal Deposit Contract
Now I will look at whether a bank that uses a deposit contract can achieve
the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
Though the bank observes the types of depositors when realized, I assume
that it cannot write type speciﬁc contracts or suspend payments according
to types. In my model, suspension of payments amounts to default on the
deposit contract16. The bank has to use the sequential service constraint
except for some cases, as I will explain now17.
I assume that the bank uses the following payment rule: In making its
payments, bank uses the ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served rule. When there is a run, the
bank abandons the ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served rule. Rather, it pays everybody
the promised if it can and if it cannot, it divides whatever it has equally
among those who demand liquidation.
When the risky asset cannot be liquidated early, AG shows that the
expected utility from the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome can be achieved by a
standard deposit contract that promises a ﬁxed payment. Bank pays its
promises using the liquid asset and if it does not have enough liquid asset
to make the promised payment, it divides all the liquid asset equally among
those who demand early liquidation.
Let f1 denote the ﬁxed payment promised to the early consumers. First
we simplify the bank’s problem using the bank’s payment rule, to get:
15See Allen and Gale (1998) for a detailed discussion.
16 In a larger contract space, there can be other arrangements that achieve higher levels
of depositor welfare. These types of arrangements are not feasible in my contract space.
17Though suspensions of payments occurred on some occasions in the nineteenth century
in US, Commercial Bank Clearing House was responsible for deciding whether and when
the suspension was appropriate. Marine National Bank was punished for suspending
payments on its own in May 1884.
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(S2)
;
?
=
Pd{ 12 x(f1(u)) +
1
2 [ x (f1) + (1 ) x (f2(U))]
v=w= (l) O+[ 6 1
If the bank chooses f1 = O@> the deposit contract can achieve the ﬁrst-
best e!cient outcome given in Table 1.
Now we relax the assumption that the risky asset can be liquidated at
w = 1= When liquidated at w = 1, the return is  eU where  5 (0> 1)=
The bank has to liquidate the risky asset if it cannot pay f1 to depositors
who demand early liquidation.
Under the possibility of costly liquidation, the deposit contract cannot
achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome from Table 1, since the bank has to go under
costly liquidation when eU = u. But when the central bank provides liquidity,
the bank does not have to go under costly liquidation. In that case, the
deposit contract of (S2) is feasible and can provide the expected utility
from the ﬁrst best allocation.
The following is a numerical example of the above discussion.
Example 1 Assume that x({) = oq({) and  = 1@2= The optimal deposit
contract can provide the ﬁrst-best e!cient expected utility. For low funda-
mentals (U = 4> u = 0=5)> H(X) = 0=2269> the optimal portfolio is (O>[) =
(0=6404> 0=3596) and f1 = 1=2808. For high fundamentals (U = 6> u = 0=75)>
H(X) = 0=3861> the optimal portfolio is (O>[) = (0=5687> 0=4313) and f1 =
1=1375.
We saw that a deposit contract, with liquidity support from the central
bank, can achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome when the return from the
bank’s investment is publicly observed. When the return is publicly ob-
served, runs are correct runs. In other words, they occur only when they
are needed to occur. But as Park (1991) empirically documents, in the ab-
sence of perfect information about the bank’s asset quality, healthy banks
have also experienced runs. In those cases, liquidity support did not prevent
runs. The policies that prevented runs on sound banks revealed the asset
quality of banks. In the following sections, consistent with the empirical
evidence, I will show that liquidity support from the central bank cannot
prevent runs on healthy banks in the absence of perfect information about
the bank’s assets. Under those conditions deposit contracts cannot achieve
the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome with public information.
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4 Noisy Private Signals
In this section, I will explain the information structure of the model with
noisy private signals. The structure is similar to the discrete signals social
learning model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) (BHW from
now on). Depositors will receive noisy signals about the quality of the bank’s
portfolio, namely about the return of the risky asset. These signals are
informative but not perfect. Therefore the signal of each depositor have
value for other depositors.
Initially, there is an exogenous order for depositors to make their de-
cisions. At w = 1, depositors learn their type and if they happen to be a
late depositor, their private signal about the bank’s asset quality18. Ba-
sically, depositors receive a vector of signals with two dimensions: (Type,
Signal). These vectors can be: (h> >)> (o> vj), (o> ve) where h stands for an
early consumer, o stands for a late consumer, vj stands for a good signal
which predicts the high return U, while ve stands for a bad signal which
predicts the low return u.
As I assumed, the bank and the depositors can observe types19. The
consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed in the Appendix20.
As explained, late depositors privately receive a noisy signal v about
the likelihood of the high return. The signals of dierent depositors are
assumed to be independent, conditional on the true return of the risky asset.
Conditional probabilities for the signals, given the true state, are :
t = Pr(vj| eU = U) = Pr(ve| eU = u)
1 t = Pr(vj| eU = u) = Pr(ve| eU = U)=
Note that t 5 (1@2> 1) so that the signals are informative but not perfect.
And as t increases, signals become more informative. Probabilities of signals
in dierent states are summarized in Table 2.
18Early depositors can receive a signal about the bank’s prospects, too. It would not
eect my results.
19This assumption makes the analysis simple without sacriﬁcing from the content of the
model. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) builds a model where depositors are faced with a
signal extraction problem. They see a queue in front of the bank but they cannot identify
the exact reason, which can be a high realization of the liquidity shock or some bad news
about the bank’s performance.
20This will contribute noise to the model. Now a withdrawal decision will be noisy
information about a bad signal. If a depositor decides to withdraw at w = 1 it can be for
two reasons:
l) She may be an early consumer.
ll) She may be a late consumer and observed a bad signal.
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state\signal Good BadeU = U t 1 teU = u 1 t t
Table 2: Probabilities of signals conditional on state.
4.1 Updating
Now I will show how depositors update their beliefs about the good state.
I assume that they use Bayes’ rule in updating their beliefs. Let sj(s) and
se(s) be the posterior probability of the good state attached by a depositor
who observe the good and the bad signal respectively, starting with a prior
of s. To save notation, I will use sj and se instead of sj(1@2) and se(1@2)>
respectively. Assuming that agents update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule,
we get:
sj =
(1@2)t
(1@2)t + (1@2)(1 t)
= t=
In the same way, we get:
se = 1 t=
I assume that depositors value signals equally. As a direct consequence of
this, good news revealed by a good signal will be washed out by bad news
from a bad signal. This result is formally stated below:
Claim 2 ;t 5
¡
1
2 > 1
¢
> sj(se(1@2)) = se(sj(1@2)) = 12 =
Proof. I will show that sj(se(1@2)) = 1@2. The other case is similar.
To ﬁnd sj(se)> I will substitute se = (1 t) for s in sj(=) and get:
sj(se) =
(1 t)t
(1 t)t + t(1 t)
=
1
2
=
Now we examine how depositors update their beliefs when they observe
a history of signals.
I assume that the actions of depositors are observable. For the moment,
suppose that the depositors can perfectly infer the signals of the other depos-
itors from their actions. They will update their beliefs about the good state
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on the basis of their own private signal and the publicly observed actions of
depositors who moved before them.
As I showed above, good news revealed by a good signal will be washed
out by the bad news from a bad signal. For this reason, for depositor l> in
updating her belief, the only thing that matters is the dierence between
the number of good signals (qlj) and the number of bad signals (qle) revealed
by the actions of depositors who moved before her, (d1> ===> dl31)> and her
private signal (vl). Therefore, all the information in (d1> ===> dl31> vl) can
be summarized as the dierence of the number of good and bad signals.
Formally speaking, ql = qlj  qle is a su!cient statistic.
Note that the history is carried through the public belief about the good
state. I will call the public belief of the high return, when it is player l’s
turn to move, as sl, which is going to be the state variable.
I would like to explain the order in which depositors move, in more
detail. This part of the analysis has dierences from BHW and there will
be an endogenous component in depositor’s timing21.
Initially, there is an exogenous order for players’ decisions. Yet, while
a withdrawal decision is irreversible, a non-withdrawal decision is not. A
depositor who chose not to withdraw when it was her turn to move, is still
in the game and can decide to withdraw later when it is her turn to move
again22. In that sense the decisions are about the timing of withdrawals,
which adds an endogenous component to the model. Figure 3 summarizes
the sequence of events in this model.
5 Contracts with Noisy Private Information
In this section, I will investigate dierent deposit contracts the bank can
choose. These contracts will have dierent probabilities of bank runs.
The ﬁrst contract I will analyze, completely eliminates runs. I will call
this the run-proof contract. Since runs carry early liquidation costs, this can
be a desirable property of a deposit contract. But to be able to prevent
runs, the bank will have to promise a small amount to early withdrawing
depositors so that even a late depositor who observed the bad signal will
get a higher expected payo by not withdrawing at w = 1. Therefore the
run-proof contract sacriﬁces from the insurance it provides against liquidity
shocks.
21We do not have many social learning models where players’ timing is endogenous. An
excellent exception is Gale and Chamley (1994).
22For simplicity I assume that she goes to the back of the line.
16
Also, when we look at the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome with public in-
formation, we see that when the bank cannot pay everybody the promised
amount, the best arrangement is to distribute all the available funds equally
among all depositors. But when bank runs are eliminated, early depositors
will get their promised amount and if the return from the bank’s invest-
ments is low, late depositors will get very little. This is another cost of
eliminating runs completely. For these reasons, it is clear that the run-proof
contract cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome. Furthermore, it may
be optimal to allow for bank runs.
Another contract, the bank can choose, is one that allows for runs. I
will call this the run contract. This contract can provide higher levels of
insurance against liquidity shocks since it is not bounded by the restrictions
of the run-proof contract. But, because of the information structure of
the model, withdrawal decisions can reveal information about the private
signals of depositors. These signals possess valuable information for other
depositors. As I will show, these information externalities can trigger a run
on a sound bank.
When we compare the run contract with the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome,
we see that another shortcoming of this contract is that late depositors may
choose to wait when they should run, as a result of information externalities.
Though the run contract can perform better than the run-proof contract,
for the explained reasons, it cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
In this section I will formalize the deposit contracts discussed above.
5.1 Run-Proof Deposit Contract
In this section, I will analyze the deposit contract that completely eliminates
runs. For this contract to work, the bank should promise a small enough
return to the early withdrawing depositors, so that even a late consumer
with the bad signal will prefer to wait until the last period.
When this deposit contract is used, no late depositor will withdraw early
and the actions of late depositors will be independent of their private signals.
No new information will be revealed during the course of the game. This
creates an informational cascade as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3 In an informational cascade, depositors choose the same ac-
tion, regardless of their private signals23.
23 In this discrete signals setup, herds are cascades are equivalent. For a distinction
between the two, see Smith and Sorensen (2000).
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Since no new information is revealed, the public belief sl will always be
equal to the prior belief of 1@2> for all depositors. All late depositors will
be in the same situation as the ﬁrst depositor and they will decide to wait
until the last period. We will be in an informational cascade where no late
depositor withdraws early. I will call this a no-run cascade.
There is another informational cascade in which late depositors choose
to withdraw early regardless of their private signals. I will call this a run-
cascade.
The run-proof contract can increase the welfare of depositors since runs
carry early liquidation costs. But the liquidity insurance provided by these
deposit contracts can be very low since the bank has to promise a small
amount to early withdrawing depositors. And also, when the return from
the risky asset is low, the optimal arrangement is to distribute the whole
portfolio equally among all depositors, but the run-proof contract cannot
achieve this.
Late depositors do not run with this type of contract and early depositors
get the promised amount f1 in both states through the liquid asset. Since
 of the depositors will turn out to be early depositors, bank will invest
 of the funds in the safe asset. Late depositors, who will be (1  ) of
the population, will get the funds invested in the risky asset at the end.
Therefore, late depositors will get:
f2( eU) =
;
?
=
(O3f1)+U[
13 if
eU = U
(O3f1)+u[
13 if
eU = u= (1)
Now, let’s look at the constraints needed for the run-proof contract to
work. The ﬁrst late depositor, upon observing the bad signal, should wait
until the last period. If she withdraws, she gets f1. Now her posterior about
the good state is se = 1  t and if she does not withdraw, she will get an
expected utility of [(1 t) x(f2(U)) + t x(f2(u))] = If the bank oers f1 such
that
x(f1) 6 (1 t) x (f2(U)) + t x (f2(u)) > (2)
the ﬁrst depositor, upon observing the bad signal, will not withdraw. The
ﬁrst depositor’s decision did not reveal any information about her private
signal. When it is the second late depositor’s turn to move, the public belief
about the good state is still 1@2= She is in the same situation as the ﬁrst late
depositor and because of inequality (2) she will not withdraw either. The
analysis will continue in this fashion and no late depositor will withdraw
early.
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Under this contract, early depositors get f1 while the late depositors get
f2( eU)=
We can write the bank’s problem as:
(S3)
;
AAA?
AA=
Pd{  x(f1) + (1 )
£
1
2 x (f2(U)) +
1
2 x (f2(u))
¤
v=w= (l) O+[ 6 1
(ll) x(f1) 6 (1 t) x (f2(U)) + t x (f2(u))
where f2(U) and f2(u) are the same as in (1).
This contract will completely eliminate bank runs. Given that early
liquidation is costly, preventing runs can increase welfare. But, note that the
constraint (ll) becomes more binding as the informativeness of the private
signals, t, increases. As t increases, the right-hand side of (ll) decreases.
Therefore to satisfy this constraint, the bank has to oer a smaller amount to
early depositors. This will undermine the insurance provided by the deposit
contract against a liquidity shock. It is clear that the run-proof contract
cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
Also note that the constraint (ll) depends on the fundamentals. If the
fundamentals are sound, formally high U and/or high u, then (ll) can be
satisﬁed for a wider range of f1 values. Therefore when the fundamentals
are not strong, preventing runs will have higher costs.
As f1 increases the left-hand side of (ll) increases while the right-hand
side decreases. Therefore depending on the parameters of the model (t>U> u),
there is a critical level of f1, denoted by f, such that when f1 is above f, (ll)
is not satisﬁed. Note that f is decreasing in t, increasing in U and u (see
Figure 1).
In the following example, I illustrate these ideas.
Example 4 Assume that x({) = oq({) and  = 1@2= At f1 = f, the left-
hand side is equal to right-hand side in constraint (ii). We get
ln(f) ln(2 f) = (1 t) ln(U) + t ln(u)=
When we take the exponential of both sides, we get
f
2 f
= U(13t)ut=
So that
f =
2U(13t)ut
1 +U(13t)ut
=
19
Note that CfCt ? 0>
Cf
CU A 0>
Cf
Cu A 0= Figure 1 presents the relationship between
f and t (dashed lines) for high (U = 6> u = 0=75) and low fundamentals
(U = 4> u = 0=5). And Figure 2 shows the expected utility provided by the run-
proof contract (dashed lines), as a function of t> for high (U = 6> u = 0=75)
and low fundamentals (U = 4> u = 0=5)=
5.2 Deposit Contract with Bank Runs
In this section, I will analyze the deposit contract that allows for bank
runs. This contract will not have the restrictions of the run-proof contract,
therefore it can provide higher levels of insurance against liquidity shocks.
Yet information externalities and herd behavior of depositors can trigger
runs on healthy banks. This will be the counterfeit of the liquidity insurance
provided by this contract.
I assume that actions of depositors are observable. The deposit contract
I will analyze will have the following features24:
• A depositor with the posterior of se = 1 t, will withdraw early.
• A depositor with the posterior of 1@2, will not withdraw early.
• A depositor with the posterior of sj = t, will not withdraw early.
If it is better to wait with a posterior of 1@2> it should also be better to
wait when the posterior is t. Therefore the third property will be automat-
ically satisﬁed when the second one is satisﬁed.
In this deposit contract, whenever the public belief about the good state
reaches a level of t> from then on no late depositor will withdraw. When the
public belief reaches a level of t, even a depositor with the bad signal will
have a posterior of 1@2 and because of the second property, this depositor,
say depositor l, will decide to wait until the last period. Note that her action
does not depend on her private signal, therefore no new information has been
revealed. So the public belief when it is the (l + 1)wk depositor’s turn to
move is still t and she will be in the same position as the lth depositor. This
starts a no-run cascade where no late depositor will withdraw early.
Also note that when the public belief drops to a level of s(2)25 even
a depositor with the good signal will withdraw early, since her posterior,
24These features hold for a depositor for whom an informational cascade has not started
yet.
25This notation has been explained in section 2.2. It corresponds to a sequence of
signals where the number of bad signals is two more than the number of good signals,
ql = qlj 3 qle = 32=
20
No-Run Cascade No Cascade Run Cascade
l = 2 t (1 t)t (1 t)2
l = q t [(1 t)t](q@2)31 [(1 t)t](q@2) (1 t)2[(1 t)t](q@2)31
Table 3: Probabilities of cascades in the good state.
taking into account her private signal, will be equal to (1  t) and by the
ﬁrst property, she should withdraw. Her action will not reveal any new
information. All the depositors after her will be in the same situation and
they will also withdraw early. Therefore, whenever the public belief drops
to a level of s(2), a run on the bank will be triggered.
Now I can calculate the probabilities of each type of cascade (run and
no-run cascades) in dierent states of nature using the discussed features of
the deposit contract. The analysis will be very similar to that in BHW: I
will start with the ﬁrst late depositor and go forward sequentially. Since I
assume that the depositors can observe each other’s type, in updating their
beliefs, late depositors will not take into account the withdrawal decisions of
early depositors. Therefore, for the following discussion, I will concentrate
on late depositors only.
I will start with the ﬁrst late depositor. Her action, d1 5 {Z>Q} where
Z and Q stand for withdraw and not-withdraw at w = 1 respectively, will
depend on her private signal. If she had the good signal, she will not with-
draw. Now the public belief is t and this starts a no-run cascade. If she had
the bad signal, she would withdraw but a run-cascade will not start yet.
Let’s look at the second late depositor. If the ﬁrst late depositor did not
withdraw, she is in a no-run cascade and will not withdraw, regardless of
her signal. If the ﬁrst late depositor withdrew early, then the public belief
is (1  t). If she observed the good signal, her posterior is 1@2> therefore
she will not withdraw. If she observed the bad signal, her posterior is s(2)
and she will withdraw. This will trigger a run on the bank.
The only history where a cascade has not started by the third late de-
positor is (d1> d2) = (Z>Q)= For that history, the public belief is 1@2 and
the third depositor is in the same position as the ﬁrst late depositor. If she
observed the good signal, she will not withdraw and this will start a no-run
cascade. If she observed the bad signal, she will withdraw early.
A cascade has not started by the fourth late depositor only when the
history is (d1> d2> d3) = (Z>Q>Z )= In that case, the fourth late depositor
is in the same situation as the second late depositor. Otherwise she is in a
cascade and her action will not depend on her private signal.
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state\outcome No Run Run
Good t13t(13t)
(13t)2
13t(13t)
Bad 13t13t(13t)
t2
13t(13t)
Table 4: Probabilities of Run and No Run in Dierent States.
The analysis continues in this manner.
Next I will calculate the probabilities for run and no-run cascades in
both states. Note that the only sequence of actions where a cascade does
not start has repetitions of (Z>Q)s, possibly followed by a Z . Otherwise,
a cascade starts.
Now, suppose it is the good state. Table 3 shows the probabilities of
these cascades for the second and the qth late depositor.
The probability of a no-run cascade until the qth late depositor is :
Sq(qr uxq|J) =
(q@2)31X
m=0
t[(1 t)t]m = t
Ã
1 [(1 t)t](q@2)
1 (1 t)t
!
When we look at the asymptotic properties of this probability, we get:
olp
q<"
Sq(qr uxq|J) =
t
1 t(1 t)
= S (qr uxq|J)=
Other probabilities can be calculated using the same analysis. Probabil-
ities for run and no-run cascades in each state are given in Table 4.
Using these probabilities, I will formally write the run contract.
Now, I will write the constraints of the run contract. These constraints
are valid for a depositor for whom a cascade has not started yet. The bank
uses the payment rule explained in section 3.2. When a run starts, the bank
will not use the ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served rule but cumulate withdrawals26. The
constraints for those cases will be discussed later.
The ﬁrst property of this contract is that a depositor with a posterior
of (1 t)27 will prefer to withdraw. If she withdraws early, she guarantees
herself f1. If she deviates and waits, others will think she observed the good
signal. This will start a no-run cascade and no other late depositor will
withdraw early. Note that this is the highest outcome a depositor can get
26Wallace (1988) and Wallace (1990) argue that the sequential service constraint is not
the optimal arrangement under some conditions.
27The only case where a cascade has not started by this depositor is that the decisions
before her were repetitions of (Z>Q)s and she observed the bad signal ve.
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state\outcome No Run Run
Good f2(U) = (O3f1)+U[13 f
Uxq
1 (U) =
(
f1 li f1 6 U
O+ U[ li f1 A U
Bad f2(u) = (O3f1)+u[13 f
Uxq
1 (u) = O+ u[
Table 5: Payos from not withdrawing when it is her turn to move.
from waiting, since liquidation of the risky asset is costly. To satisfy this,
we need
x(f1) A t x (f2(u)) + (1 t) x (f2(U)) = (3)
According to the second property of this contract, a depositor with a
posterior of 1@228 should wait. The consequences of this constraint is not as
immediate as the previous one since this action will not start an informa-
tional cascade. The return from waiting will be random depending on the
state as in other cases, but also on what the depositors after her will do.
We can have run and no-run cascades in both the good and the bad
state. A player’s payo depends on the state as well as the occurrence of a
run as summarized in Table 5.
If there is no run on the bank then late depositors get the return from
the risky asset which is the same as in the run-proof contract, given in (1):
f2( eU) =
;
?
=
(O3f1)+U[
13 if
eU = U
(O3f1)+u[
13 if
eU = u=
If a bank run starts at some point, the late depositor who chose not
to withdraw when it was her turn can join the run. But now she cannot
guarantee herself f1 since the bank cumulates withdrawals and pays everyone
f1 if it can, but if it cannot, it equally divides whatever is available among
those who demand early liquidation. If  A f1@U> even the risky asset is
liquidated at a discount, everybody can get their promised of f1 in the good
state. In the bad state and in the good state when  ? f1@U> the bank
cannot pay everybody the promised so it equally divides whatever it has
among those who wants to withdraw.
28The only case where a cascade has not started by this depositor is that the decisions
before her were repetitions of (Z>Q)s followed by a Z , and she observed the good signal
vj.
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Using these payos from Table 5 and the probabilities from Table 4,
we get the constraint for a late depositor with a posterior of 1@2 not to
withdraw, as:
x(f1) ?
1
2(1 t(1 t))
"
t x (f2(U)) + (1 t) x (f2(u))+
(1 t)2 x
¡
fUxq1 (U)
¢
+ t2 x(fUxq1 (u))
#
= H(X odwh)
When a run is triggered, the late depositors who chose not to withdraw
when it was their turn to move can choose to join the run. This adds an
endogenous component to the timing of withdrawal choices. We may need
dierent constraints for them to choose to join29.
Now we can state the bank’s problem:
(S4)
;
AAAA?
AAAA=
Pd{ H(Xhduo|) +H(X odwh)
v=w= (l) O+[ 6 1
(ll) x(f1) A t x (f2(u)) + (1 t) x (f2(U))
(lll) x(f1) ? H(X odwh)
where f2(U)> f2(u)> fUxq1 (U) and fUxq1 (u) are the same as in Table 530.
29A run is triggered when the public belief drops to s(32). The bank no longer uses
the ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served rule. Payos from not withdrawing when it is her turn to move
but joining the run later are dierent from the payos in Table 5. If a late depositor joins
the run and if it is the good state, she gets f1 when  A f1@U> she gets O + U[ when
 ? f1@U= If she joins the run and if it is the bad state, she gets O+ u[= If she does not
join the run, she gets fUxq2 ( eU) which is f2(U) if it is the good state and  A f1@U> and 0
otherwise. That is:
fUxq2 (U) =
(
f2(U) li f1 6 U
0 li f1 A U
and fUxq2 (u) = 0.
For her to join the run we should have
(13 t) x(fUxq1 (U)) + t x(f
Uxq
1 (u)) A (13 t) x(f
Uxq
2 (U)) + t x(0)=
Assuming that x(0) is a small enough number, we can satisfy this constraint easily (for
example x(=) = oq(=)).
30 In this type of contract, if there is no run, all early depositors get the promised f1. If
there is a run, they get fUxq1 (U) in the good state and fUxq1 (u) in the bad state. Ex-ante,
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Now I would like to investigate how the parameters of the model (t>U> u> )
will aect the constraints and the objective function.
First we observe that the critical value of f1 for constraint (ll) to be
satisﬁed is f, the critical value for the constraint in the run-proof contract.
This constraint is satisﬁed for values of f1 A f. We have seen before that f
decreases in t and increases in U and u. Therefore keeping other parameters
constant, as the informativeness of the signals increase, this constraint be-
comes less binding, which increases the welfare provided by the run-contract.
The LHS of (lll) is increasing while the RHS is decreasing in f1. There-
fore there is a critical level of f1, denoted as f, above which (lll) is not
satisﬁed.
It is not clear whether the RHS of (lll) will increase or decrease as the
signals become more informative. Therefore the eect of more informative
signals is ambiguous on this constraint.
Now I would like to investigate how fundamentals (U> u) aect the con-
straint and the objective function. As U and u increases, RHS of (ll) in-
creases so we need higher values of f1 to satisfy this constraint. It makes
this constraint more binding. But this increases the RHS of (lll) and makes
it less binding. So when the fundamentals are strong, it is not clear whether
the choice set becomes larger or smaller. Clearly, strong fundamentals have
a positive eect on the objective function.
As the liquidation cost goes down, constraint (ll) is not aected, while
the RHS of constraint (lll) increases so that the bank’s choice set becomes
larger. This is because when the liquidation costs are low, the cost of bank
runs is low. Note that as  increases, the objective function also increases.
Therefore a low liquidation cost makes the run contract more attractive.
Though the run contract can give better results than the run-proof con-
tract, it is quite clear that it cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome.
In the next section I will investigate how the liquidity support can improve
the run contract but even in that case, it cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best e!-
cient outcome.
the probability of the good state is 1@2 and using the probabilities from Table 4, we ﬁnd
the expected utility of the early depositors as:
H(Xhduo|) = 1
2(13 t(13 t))
h
x(f1) + (13 t)2 x(fUxq1 (U)) + t
2 x(fUxq1 (u))
i
=
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6 Liquidity Support
In this section I will introduce a central bank that will act as a lender of last
resort and provide liquidity support to the bank. This liquidity support will
improve the run contract since the bank does not have to go under costly
liquidation of the risky asset when faced with a run. But as I will show,
in the absence of public information about the bank’s soundness, liquidity
support will not be enough to achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome with
public information.
Bagehot (1873) recommends that in a time of crisis, a central bank should
lend freely at a very high rate of interest and these loans should be made
on all good banking securities. In my model, the central bank will lend
only against good collateral31 as Bagehot (1873) recommends. Actually the
best justiﬁcation for this comes from Bagehot’s own words: “Any aid to a
present bad bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a
good bank32”.
However, I will not use the second rule which recommends to lend at
a very high rate. The central bank will lend at a zero interest rate in this
model. Actually lending at a high rate can worsen the banking crisis33 and
can give managers the incentive to take very high, uneconomical risks. In
practice, there have been episodes where Bagehot’s rule of lending at a very
high rate has been challenged, as Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1995) and
Prati and Schinasi (1999) document.
With the liquidity support from the central bank, the bank does not
have to go under costly liquidation of the risky asset. Simply it can lend the
risky asset in its portfolio to the central bank which will provide liquidity
at w = 1 in the amount that is equal to the value of the risky asset at w = 2.
This contract is a special case of the run contract,  = 1 now.
The probabilities for run and no-run cascades in each state will be the
31 I assume that the central bank knows the value of the bank’s assets when providing
liquidity. For a discussion, see Section 7.
32 In practice, we see interventions when the bank is insolvent (Prati and Schinasi (1999)
and Giannini (1999)). The justiﬁcation for this is the possibility of contagion to the
banking system (Diamond and Rajan (2002)). Since I have only one bank in my model, it
is not a suitable model to study contagion. Another reason for interventions to insolvent
banks is pointed out by Santomero and Homan (1998). They show that for US, between
1985 and 1991, access to the discount window was granted to banks that later failed.
They argue that the reason for this was to keep institutions aﬂoat so that the deposit
insurance fund did not suer further losses. This can be another destabilizing eect of
deposit insurance.
33See Garcia and Plautz (1988).
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state\outcome No Run Run
Good f2(U) = (O3f1)+U[13 f
Uxq
1 (U) = f1
Bad f2(u) = (O3f1)+u[13 f
Uxq
1 (u) = O+ u[
Table 6: Payos from not withdrawing when it is her turn to move (with
liquidity support).
same as in Table 4. The contract will be the same as the run contract in
section 5.2. but the payos will come from Table 6 now.
Now we can state the run contract. The bank’s problem is:
S (5)
;
AAA?
AAAA=
Pd{ H(Xhduo|) +H(X odwh)
v=w= (l) O+[ 6 1
(ll) x(f1) A t x (f2(u)) + (1 t) x (f2(U))
(lll) x(f1) ? H(X odwh)
where f2(U)> f2(u)> fUxq1 (U) and fUxq1 (u) are the same as in Table 6.
Since this is a special case of the run contract, the parameters of the
model (t>U> u) will aect the constraints and the objective function in the
same way as before.
The following example focuses on constraint (lll).
Example 5 Suppose x({) = oq({) and  = 1@2= I would like to ﬁnd the
critical value f= From constraint (ii) we get
(1 + t)2 ln(f) ln(2 f) t2 ln
µ
f+ (2 f)u
2
¶
= t ln(U) + (1 t) ln(u)=
Taking the exponential of both sides, we get
f(1+t)2
(2 f)
³
f+(23f)u
2
´t2 = Ut u(13t)=
We can ﬁnd the value of f below which (iii) is satisﬁed using the above
equality. Figure 1 (solid lines) shows the values of f for low (U = 4> u = 0=5)
and high fundamentals (U = 6> u = 0=75)=
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Because of the explained trade-o of preventing runs, for some parameter
values, it may be optimal to allow for runs even if they can be generated
by herd behavior of depositors and can be on healthy banks. The relation
between the parameters and the utilities provided by the contracts were
explained within the text when we analyze how the parameters aect the
constraints and the objective functions for each contract. The example below
illustrates these points.
Example 6 The table below shows the expected utilities from dierent con-
tracts the bank can choose for dierent values of t with low fundamentals
(U = 4> u = 0=5)
Run Contract
with Liquidity
Run-Proof
Contract
t = 0=60 0=1319 0=1733
t = 0=75 0=1836 0=1695
t = 0=90 0=2147 0=1441
Figure 2 shows the expected utilities from run (solid lines) and run-proof
(dashed lines) contracts with low (U = 4> u = 0=5) and high fundamentals
(U = 6> u = 0=75)= For low values of t, the run-proof contract is better but
as t increases, allowing for runs becomes optimal. From Figure 2, we see
that, for low fundamentals, the range of q values for which the run contract
performs better than the run-proof contract is larger than the same range
with high fundamentals. This is because, preventing runs have higher welfare
costs when fundamentals are not strong.
Since the bank does not have to go under costly liquidation of the risky
asset it is quite clear that the liquidity support improves the performance
of the run contract. But as we saw, the liquidity support does not prevent
runs on healthy banks, which is consistent with the historical evidence pro-
vided by Park (1991). For the run contract to achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient
outcome, it is crucial that runs are correct, that is, they occur only when
they are needed to. For these reasons, in the absence of perfect information
about banks’ asset quality, a deposit contract, even with liquidity support
from the central bank, cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best e!cient outcome with
public information.
7 Policy Implications
This paper makes important suggestions on the policy side. In my model,
deposit insurance can prevent runs and since early liquidation is costly, this
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can be welfare improving. Yet it is a well-known fact that with deposit
insurance34, depositors do not have any incentive to dierentiate between
sound and unsound banks. In such an environment, weak banks do not
have any di!culty in attracting deposits. This creates an opportunity for
moral hazard on banks’ side. Actually, some studies argue that guaran-
tees create distortions and make bank failures more likely. Demirguc-Kunt
and Detragiache (2000) analyze panel data for 61 countries during 1980-97
and concludes: “Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank
stability, the more so when institutional environment is weak, when the
coverage is extensive and when the insurance is run by the government35.”
Financial regulators and policy makers have been looking for alternatives
for full deposit insurance. Giving a greater role on market discipline may
lessen the moral hazard created by guarantees. For market discipline to work
eectively, depositors should have accurate information about the soundness
of banks. As this paper shows, in the absence of accurate information,
information externalities and herd behavior of depositors can trigger runs
on healthy banks. This in turn undermines the role of market discipline in
keeping an eye on bank activities. Therefore disclosure of information on
banks’ structure, performance and risk positions should be enforced. This
is pillar three of Basel II regime and this should be fully pursued to increase
the eectiveness of market discipline, which can be an alternative for deposit
insurance in achieving ﬁnancial stability.
Another important point with the disclosure of information is the contin-
uous review of banks’ performance which is “pillar two” of Basel II regime.
In my model, I assume that the central bank knows the value of the bank’s
assets when providing liquidity. In some situations, it can be di!cult for a
central bank to identify the exact source of a problem in a bank, i.e. whether
it is a solvency or a liquidity problem36. Actually, Berger et.al (1998) test
the hypothesis that supervisors have more accurate information than the
market on the soundness of ﬁnancial institutions for the US case. They
show that shortly after supervisors have inspected a bank, supervisory as-
sessment of the bank is more accurate than the market. But, for periods
34For an excellent survey on deposit insurance practices and current discussions, see
Garcia (2000).
35 In parallel with this ﬁnding, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2003) show that partial deposit
insurance can diminish the severity of bank runs, therefore full deposit insurance can be
ine!cient.
36Diamond and Rajan (2001) build a model where liquidity and solvency problems
interact. They show that bank failures can themselves cause liquidity shortages which
may cause a total meltdown of the system.
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where the supervisory information is not up-to-date, market has more ac-
curate information than the supervisors. By continuously (or frequently)
reviewing bank’s performance, authorities can take preemptive action and
act rapidly when faced with banking problems. This can minimize the costs
generated by disruptions to the payments system. In that sense, pursuing
pillar two of the Basel II regime is crucial.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I built a dynamic model of bank runs that allowed me to
study important phenomena such as the role of information externalities
and herd behavior of depositors as a source of bank runs. I showed that,
in the presence of noisy private information, information externalities and
herd behavior of depositors can trigger runs on healthy banks. The bank
can choose a deposit contract that completely eliminates runs but this has
some costs. That type of contract sacriﬁces from the insurance provided
against liquidity shocks. Furthermore, in cases where the bank cannot pay
everybody the promised amount, it may be socially optimal to have a run,
as shown in AG. These are some costs of completely eliminating runs.
The bank can also choose a deposit contract that allows for runs. For
some parameter values, it can be optimal to allow for runs even they can be
generated by herd behavior of depositors and they can be on healthy banks.
The results of the paper are in parallel with the empirical evidence on
measures that prevent bank runs. While liquidity support alleviates the
costs of early liquidation, it cannot prevent runs on healthy banks. The
policy measure that will prevent wrong runs is the disclosure of informa-
tion on banks’ soundness and management of the crisis. A deposit contract,
with liquidity support from the central bank, can achieve the ﬁrst-best e!-
cient outcome only in the presence of perfect information about the bank’s
performance.
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Appendix
A Unobserved Types
Now I will relax the assumption that types are observed by the depositors.
As explained, this will contribute noise, but the previous results will continue
to hold. For all the analysis below, I assume that an informational cascade
has not started yet. The following analysis is for the case where the public
belief is equal to 1@2 but it certainly holds for the general case.
If a depositor decides to withdraw at w = 1 it can be for two reasons:
l) She may be an early consumer (with probability ) or
ll) She may be a late consumer and observed a bad signal (with proba-
bility (1 ) ((1@2)(1 t) + (1@2)t) = 1@2(1 )=37
So when a depositor decides to withdraw at w = 1, the conditional prob-
ability that she is a late consumer and observed a bad signal is :
Pr(ve|Z ) =
(1@2)(1 )
+ (1@2)(1 )
=
1 
1 + 
=
Using the value  = 12 , we get:
Pr(ve|Z ) =
1@2
3@2
=
1
3
=
If a depositor does not withdraw, it reveals that she has certainly observed
a good signal.
Pr(vj|Q) = 1=
In this case early consumers will add extra noise to the model and a with-
drawal decision will now be noisy information for the realization of a bad
signal.
Let sQ be the conditional probability that we are in the good state, given
a non-withdrawal decision. Then we have:
sQ = Pr( eU = U|Q) = sj = 1 t=
37A depositor is a late consumer with probability (1 3 )= With probability 1@2 it is
the good state and a late consumer observes a bad signal with probability (1 3 t) in
the good state. With probability 1@2 it is the bad state and a late consumer observes a
bad signal with probability t in the bad state. Therefore the probability of this case is
(13 ) ((1@2)(13 t) + (1@2)t) =
35
Let sZ be the conditional probability that we are in the good state given
a withdrawal decision. With probability 1@2 we are in the good state and
a depositor withdraws early in the good if she is an early consumer (with
probability ) or if she is a late consumer and observed the bad signal (with
probability (1 )(1 t)). Therefore
sZ =
(1@2) (+ (1 )(1 t))
+ (1@2)(1 )
=
1 t(1 )
(1 + )
=
Using the value  = 12 , we get:
sZ =
2 t
3
=
Claim 7 ; 5 (0> 1)> se = 1 t ? sZ ? 1@2.
Proof. Note that CsZC A 0=When  = 0> sZ = 1t = se. When  = 1>
sZ = 1@2=
The analysis is similar to that of the case without the early consumers.
Since sZ A se, sZ (sj(s)) A s so that we will need more than one, (say,
nW) withdrawals to cancel out the eect of a non-withdrawal. We will now
have to deal with the cases in which we observe one non-withdrawal and n
withdrawals where n ? nW. So we will have more cases of interest for the
purposes of writing the optimal deposit contract but the analysis will be
similar.
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Figure 1: Critical values of c1 for the constraints. 
Figure 2: Expected utility for Run and No-Run contracts as a function of q for different fundamentals. 
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Figure 3: Sequence of events. 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 
·  Nature chooses the state. 
·  Depositors learn their type 
and receive private signals. 
·  Returns are realized. 
·  Banks choose the deposit 
contract to offer. 
·  Depositors make their 
investment choices. 
·  Bank chooses the portfolio 
of assets. 
·  Depositors make their 
withdrawal decisions. 
·  If there is no run, early 
depositors get their promised. 
·  If there is a run, bank 
cumulates withdrawals. 
·  Late depositors who did not 
withdraw their return. 
